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Abstract. Philosophy of science is largely inclined to portray science as a success
and on one patt of philosophical study of science, that of offering philosophical ac-
counts of models and modelling in science. A sound philosophical account of mod-
e modelling fhilure' The
a nt of modelling failure
c Here I exPose mY own
account to such a test using an example fiom economics (its alleged tailure in antici-
pating and conceiving the 2008 financial crisis), showing how my account provides an
ôncompassing framework fbr identifying and analyzing f'ailures in modelling.
Keywords: models, models in economics, modelling t'ailure, economics, philosophy
of economics, financial crisis.
1 Science fails too
systematic attention of philosophy of science = not just as an unfortunate accidental
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much 01'conventional philosophy of science is analogical to the urge of mainstream
economics to show how wonderfully markets function.
Naturally, the ambition to understand f'ailure in science lnust be divided into lnan-
ageable portions. Here I t'ocus on one prorninent style of scientific inquiry, that of
nrodelling, and on one part of philosophical stucly of science, that of offèring philo-
sophical accounts of models and modelling in science. There are many such accounts
available in the literatut'e, and the challenge is to compare them f'or their credentials.
One obvious way to proceed is to check them against empirical evidence concerning
actual models and actual rnodelling practices. And provided we take these practices to
include failures, then the capacity of the philosophical accounts in dealing with such
failures may be taken as a major criterion of the success of those accounts. A sound
philosophical account ofmodelling should contain resources for identifying and diag-
nosing modelling failure. The ability to articulate (at least rudiments of) a systematic
account of modelling fäilure can be used as a test of one's account of rnodel and mod-
elling. Here I expose lny own accöunt to such a test, showing how it provides an
encompassing framework lbl identifying and analyzing f'ailures in rnoclelling.
2 Failure of model, failure of target: Economics and
the financial crisis
'Modelling failure' is ambiguous between modelling <failure in the target system>
and' failure in <modelling>. In the flrst category, the fäilure lies in the f'unctioning of
the tzrget system rather than in an attempt to model the target system. The possibility
of such a failure applies to target systems to which ,üe are entitled to ascribe some
idea of proper f'unctioning. Scientists can then model such 1àilures of their target
systems to function properly, such as heart f'ailure in the human body, business failure,
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rnarket fäilure, failure of lnaterials, t'ailule of machines in lnanutacturing systerns,
f'ailure of engineered al'l'angernents such as energy systems and jointed rock slopes to
resist landslides, and so on.
Scientists may be successful in modelling failure. Or they may f'ail in moclelling fäil-
ur.es in their target systelns. Ot' they may succeed ot täil in rnodelling the proper
(non-failing) functioning of their target systems. It is an instance of the second çoln-
binatio¡ that I will use as an illustration in what f'ollows. I will be discussing tools and
acts and strategies of mctdelling that allegedly fail to ntodel the failure,s of ,some tar-
get systenxs - such as this example fiom matelials physics: "Traditional hyperelastic
models of'materials ignore the fàct that no material can sustain large enough deforllta-
rions without fàilure." (Votokh, 2010, p. 684) Here models f'ail to model lailure due to
ernploying the excessively idealizing assumption of hyperelasticity. The illustration
I will use latel- in the papel is of this sort of double failure: failure in economics ttr
model the läilures of the fìnancial systern. The possible sources of failure, however,
will bc shown to be tär more variecl than just a single idealizing assulrrption.
to the American Econolnic Association:
,,The lem ['macroeconomics'] then ret'erred to the body of knowledge
ancl expet.tise that we hoped would pfevent the recul'rence of that eco-
nomic disaster. My thesis t'..1 is that macroeconomics ["'] has suc-
ceeiled: Its central problem ofclepression prevention has been solved, fbr
all practical purposes, and has in täct been solved tbr many decades."
(Lucas,2003, P. l)
Soon thereafter, things went badly wfong (in fact they were getting wrong at the time
of Lucas's statetnent). In a f'ew years, triggered by the subplirne lnortgage crisis that
burst the bubble in the US housing markets, the global financial system would collapse
- without anticipations, warnings, or recomlnendations as to how to prevent it oflered
by the profession that had just a while earìier congratulated itself lbr having solved
the problem.
The generation of the crisis was no simple pl'ocess. It is therefore no surprise lhat
the aflennath of the linancial crisis of 2008 has exhibited an almost proverbial blame
The discipline of economics has received its share of the blame' Even those who
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predictive capacities of the highly abstract mathematical models that have become so
popular in the discipline. In July 2009, the cover of rhe Economist asked: "what went
wrong with econornics?" A bit later, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman (2009) famously
wrote in The New YorkTime,s Magazine:
"[. . . ] the economics prot'ession went astray because economists, as a
group, rnistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, f'or truth,
[. . . ] V/hen it comes to the all-too-human problem of recessions and de-
pressions, economists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution of
assurning that everyone is rational and lnarkets work perf'ectly. The vi-
sion that elnerges as the profession rethinks its foundations may not be
all that clear; it certainly won't be neat; but we can hope that it will have
the virtue of being at least partly right."
The above passage provides rudiments of a rnethodological diagnosis of the alleged
failures of economics. It clairns that economists have been preoccupied with the
beauty and neatness of their tnodels, expressed in impressive mathenratics, while they
have fbrgotten the task of looking for truths about the real world. As to the contents of
their models, the claim is that economists have envisaged a fantasy world of perf'ectly
rational agents in perf'ectly self-regulating markets, and this fantasy world is l-oo far
removed tiom the imperlèctions of the teal world to be helpful f'or acquiring truthful
inforrnation about the latter. The economics profession is criticizecl fbr holding an all
too strong f'aith in the powers of the invisible hand, manifesting itself in the widely
accepted and applied but allegedly failed DSGE (dynamic stochastic general eqLrilib-
rium) models in macroeconomics and those of efficient markets in finance.
The remarks in the fbllowing sections will provide an elaboration of such rather pop-
ular Krugman-style allegations. This will be done by dealing with the alleged fäilures
of economics vis-à-vis the financial crisis as rnodelling f'ailures and by ofÏering a se-
ries of possible partial diagnoses of difTerent kinds and sources of modelling failure.
Modelling is a multi-stage and multi-1àceted cognitive process, so there are multiple
sources of, and multiple opportunities fbr, possible failure - as well as multiple ideas
of what constitutes tàilure. Some of these will be mapped. For this [ask, we need an
account ofmodel and rnodeling that is rich enough for exhibiting several such oppor-
tunities for failure.
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3 An account of model and modelling
In the last couple of decades, philosophy of science has lecogttized models as alnong
the key cognitive tools in science and modelling as one of the key activities in scientilìc
practice. It has become a major industry within philosophy of science to produce ac-
counts o[ model and modelling in science. These accounts have often been generated
and applied (sometimes even tested) using historical and contemporary case studies
in a variety of scientific disciplines, fiom physics and biology to the social sciences.
I will now briefly summarise my own accoultt and then put it into use tbr highlighr
ing failure rather than success, with economics and the financial crisis serving as the
illustrative case. Its capacity in this role provides a test ol'iLs general adequacy.
Philosophers of science have rnoved beyond the idea that models involve a simple two-
place representational relationship between the model and its trgef; M is a model of
target R.It is now commonplace to conceive of lepresentational models as more com-
plex, involving in addition an agent and a purpose: Agent A uses (build's, employs) M
as a model of target R for purpose P (see e.g. Giere, 1999). Some philosophers wish
to add further components in the modelling relationship, such as some idea of an inter-
pretat¡on (see e.g. Weisberg, 2Ol3).I have proposed that representational modelling is
still more complex (e.g. Mäki 2009b,2011b,2011a). My account portrays model rep-
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[ModRep] can be put in words only
AgentA
uses lnulti-component object M as
a teplesentative of (actual or possible) target R
fbr purpose P,
addressing audience E,
at least potentially prompting genuine issues of relevant resemblance
bel"ween M and R to arise;
describing M and drawing inferences about M and R in terns of one or
more model descriptions D;
applies commentary c to identify and coorclinate the other cornponents;
and all this takes place within a context X.
Among the novelties here we can list the involvement of an audience; the idea that
Inerely potentially giving rise to genuine issues of relevant leselnblance is neetled for
representation to be in place; a rich functionally loaded notion of commentary; and a
generous placcholder fbr var.ious contextual fäctors.
A simple version of the idea of succe,ss in modelling would say that success occurs
when relevant resemblance between M and R becomes secured. This requires, fbr
example, that the causal structure or causal fbrces captured in the model relevantly re-
semble those in the target; the model descriptions are of the sort that enable the needed
infèrences; and that the cornponents of [ModRep] become coordinated ancl comuru-
nicated so that purposes P and audiences ã are suflìciently served. Finally, context c
must be such that it is sufficiently supportive of those accomplishments.
We can then say thatJ'ailure in rnodelling occurs when relevant resemblance between
M and R täils to be secured, in one way or another, fbr one or another of the various
possible reasons that The components [ModRepl and their
relations will next be loci and sources of modelling fäilure.
It appears that many nomic modelling can be construecl as
fbcusing on some specific component in the structure of [ModRep] and that some
other possible critiques can also be envisaged within this fiarnework. In both cases, it
seems obvious that the claims about possible sources of f'ailure can be tnade sharper.
than without the liamework of [MoclRep] and that the fiamework will also enable
tnore fbcused assesslnents of thc credibility of such claìms.2 I will next rush through
the framework component by cornponent.
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4 Multiple sources of modelling failure
I will exhibit the usefulness of the [ModRep] liamework for organizing some of the
popular rnisgivings about economic modelling - fbl identilying and localizing the
variclus criticisms of economic rnodels fbr their fäilures regarding the fìnancial crisis
(ancl surely beyond this casc as similar criticisms are a chronic lèature of debates
arounil economics). It appears that all components listed in [ModRep] have been or
can be charged fbr not having done well.
Agent A
Identifying the agent of rnodelling as a separate compoltent, and attributing charac-
teristics to it, is somewhat awkwald since this is the rnelting pot where the influences
of the other components get together. This is fbrtified by the f'act that individual and
collective agency intel'act and clepend on one another. The individuals inventing an<l
proposing models have been educated and socialized in the collective disciplinary
culture ancl prevalent fashions of research practice. On the other hand, the individ-
ual mocleller must persuade the collective to join her in using an object as a model.
The identity and properties of A make a diff'erence fbl whether A qualilìes as a (cred-
ible) economist; what sorts of models are being built and examined, shaped by A's
skills and background belief's; what is taken seriously as a model wolth sotne further
attention; ancl so on.
Econornists are generally recognised as intelligent people. Yet the critics argue that
this is uot sufficient fbl successful modelling and that the fàilules regarding the 2008
crisis are one indication of this. They say econolnists are too narrowly educated
(mainly just in conternporary economics, ntath and statistics), too ignorant about his-
tory (of the economy and of theil own discipline), about the other social sciences,
about culture and human psychology. Some say their competences and epistemic
pref'erences are ill suited fbr moctelling the cornplexities of social reality. Their math-
ernatically inclined style of inquiry encourages them to streamline the nuances of the
real world in epistemically harmful ways: they are extremely skilful in mathenati-
cal puzzle solving when reasoning about the rnodel worlds, but relatively speaking
clumsy and uninfbrmed in connecting their f'onnulas to the detailed complexities of
real world economies. These capacities and their lirnitations may also nurture over-
conficlence, hubris, and aÍogance - characteristics often attributed to the econotnics
prof'ession and conclucive to the sorts of failure witnessed in connection to the 2008
crisis (see e.g. Posnel'2009; Fourcade et al' 201 5).
Regarding the contents ol'their worldviews, thel'e is empirical literature suggestirrg
that econonrists al'e more self'-seeking than other prolèssions, either due to econotnics
eclucation or selt'-selection (see e.g. Carter & Irons, l99l). This may be suggested to
resull" in systematic biases in favour of models that put too much stress on self'-seeking
behaviour amongst the populace at large.
, . . Ltses multi-component object M as
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(Stiglitz, 2011, p. 172).
Models of elÎcient lìnancial markets rely on strong idealizing assumptions such as
zero transaction costs and perf'ect and symmetrical ìnl.brmation between the agents.
These idealizations help produce an image of the f,nancial systern in which rnarket
prices fully incorporate all relevant intbrmation and in which there can be no bubbles
ìn asset prices such as those of'stocks or houses. This is a model system that has the
features of being self'-regulated and having the capacity of containing all relevant risks
without external legulation (so Alan Greenspan and others believing in these models
wet'e able to relax). Critics argue that such an exclusion of leal-world imperfections
from the models is t'atal, suggesting that the properties of real-world markets may in
fäct be the reverse of those of the model-world markets: ". . . where the Eflcient Mar-
kets Hypothesis suggests that financial markets provicle a way of managing economic
risk, the evidence suggests that they are actually a major source of risk.,' (euiggin,
2010, p. .51)
Macroeconomic models, in their turn, have employed the highly ictedlized notion of
representative agents. These models have chronically missed the crucial causal fac-
fors such as anirnal spirits, herd behaviour, int'ormational asymmetries, structure of
financial markets, and corporate governance, therefbre fäiling to recognize phenom-
ena such as excess indebtedness, debt restructuring, bankruptcy, and agency problems.
The critical verdict is that any model with these characteristics "leaves out rnuch, if
not most, of what is to be explained; if that model were correct, the phenomena - the
rnajor recessions, depressions and crises that we seek to understand - would not and
could not have occurred" (stiglitz 201 l, 168; see Akerlof and shiller 2009). so the
failure regarding this conlponent is a lnatter of leaving out froln the models important
(e.g. bubble-generating) factors and mechanisrns that are responsible for the sort of
crisis we havejust expelienced.
. . . a representative of (acttnl or possible) target R
The key point of modelling is that models stand fbr their targets as theìr representa-
tives, and that models are directly examined f'or their properties and behaviour so as
to indirectly acquire information about their targets. This involves a sort of objectifi-
cation orreilìcation of model systetns as such direct subjects of inquiry. One simple
tailure lured by this is the f'ailure to distinguish between 
the model and the target in
one's reasoning, to proceecl, withouf further systelnatic 
inquity, as i1'the tnodel systern
is the target system, ancl to believe that the properties 
discovered to be possessed by
a mo<lel are also properties of its targets. This is a very old criticism 
of econotnic
models, levelled already in the 19th century. It is still topical today, also in relation to
the modelling fàilures regarding the 2008 crisis'
The targets of rnodels can be either actuaì or merely possible objects 
ol' systems, and
whether they afe one or the other has consequences tbr what kind 
of inf'ormation
modetling càn cleliver, and what sorts of täilure may occur' Even 
though models can
be required to ultirnately stand for some actual target objects ol' systems 
(such as
really existing macro ectnomies or the current global financial 
system), econolnists
often treat their models as representatives of some possible targets, using 
thetn as
toolsfbrhow-possiblyexplanations.oftenaneconolnistsirnplytakesonthetaskof
examining whåther it is pàssible to derive a given stylized fact liom the assurnptio's
of individuaì optimizing behaviour, that is, whether it is conceivable that 
the stylized
f.act is an outcorne of tñe functioning of a mechanism involving such 
behaviour' Or
an econotnist may examine the ctlnditions under which a sirnple 
irnagined tnarket
Systemisstable.Itmayhappenthatnoone(ornocontemporaryecol]olnist,orno
suffìcient nurnber of economists credible enough to have theil voices heard) 
takes
the task of establishing whether these connections also obtain in some 
actual target
systerr. This means túat no infbrmation is generated about actual 
systens' Such a
situation may miss important facts about the relevant astual target 
systems' such as
the global financial systeln.
One can conceive of the very itlea ol a model's target with cliff'erent degrees 
of speci-
ficity,intermsofavaryingmagnitu<leolattributes'Withasuflcientlyrichnotionof
targåt, one can then ariue-thatih" toilut" oleconomic modelling was to 
be preoccu-
pied with relatively stable, bubble-free economies as the ln
meant missing the actually emerging dramatic instabilitie
crisis-prone economies. This is to say those models deal
market ineffìciencies <1o not arise" (Siiglitz,2Ol1, p. 166) or that they do 
not apply
to economies that are capable of generating bubbles' In other words, the 
targets of
the criticized models r"rà too narrowly conceived, especially as they crowdecl 
out ac-
tualtargetsthatmatteredgreatlyatthetime'BenBernanke(2010)acknowledgesthe
prernise of this reasoning]Uut uses it 1'or defending macroeconomic models, 
arguing
that they work lìne undei ordina'y conditions: "Economic lnodels are 
uselul only in
the coniext fbr which they are designed. Most of the tirne, i'cluding during 
reces-











There is a vast rnultiplicity of possible p
- can serve, or intended or presumed to s
phenornenon or aspect of the phenomeno
this or that accuracy of timing, magnitud
scenarios; solving this or that puzzle (so a
orating this or that new or oìd technical t
these or those desired f'eatures; educating o
politicians); and so ol.l.
thout specifying the relevant
mong other things. This pr.o_
can serve multiple pufposes,
ected or fbund to serve _ one
'be evaluated
those purposes. It is worth noting that the issue of t 
vlng
domain of'a model's applicability (that we just briefl :ii
fransfbrmed into an issue of the purposes of rnoclelling. This is what Stiglitz ,ugg"rr*
"Is the pulpose of an economic Ûrodel to help us predict a little bit better how the
econolny is performing in 'normal' times - when things do not rnatter much? or, is
the purpose of an economic model to preclict, prevent and rnanage big fluctuations and





(e.g. quanti h rhe
An even heavier charge is for a failure of conception: economists not only f'ailed to
predict the crisis, they fäiled to conceive it, which is even more serious. As much as
Many clitics have pointed out that most respectable
parts ol'economic modelling may e timely needs of
eftèctive economic policy - such atic kinds of real
world developmenl or even the recognition of their possibility based on accou¡ts of the
complex systeln of underlying mechanisms. The suspicion is that economists are in-
Modelling fàilure 391
clined to address relatively srnall and easy specialized intra-academic puzzle-solving
challenges so as to maximize their academic performance measured in telms of pub-
lication output, rather than to tackle big and difficult issues that take more time and
effbrt and are lìlore risky in their capacity to yield an itnpressive publication record'
Perhaps the dominant pulposes of modelling have become rather fragmented and in-
ward looking.
These observations inspire two further remarks. The f,rst is that given the large variety
of possible purposes, there is also a large variety of ways of läiling (so it is easy to
t'aii) as well as of ways of escaping charges of f'ailure (so it is difÍìcult to f'ail). One can
def'encl a model or a model tbrmat by varying the associated purposes' In response to
(alleged) f'ailure in relation to (inteldecl or presumed) pufpose P¡ the modeller makes
on 
"^"ur" 
or escape by proposing an allege<lly more appropriate purpose P2 and by
claiming success in relation to P2 (and in response to the possible further failure in
relation to P2 the modeller escapes by proposing another purpose P3, an<l so on). No
doubt this structure has been in place in the debates around economics. The second
remark is that there is a limit to the room that can be pennitted fbr escape. The
purposes of modelling themselves are and should be subject to critical scrutìny and
debate. Not all possible pulposes are equally appropriate. Some purposes just cannot
be ignored without damaging the legitimacy of a modelling discipline.
... addressing audience E,
Moclelling is always acldressed to some audience or set of audiences. Models are used
to convey infbrmation to audiences, to educate them, to itnpress theln, to persuade
them, to use them as test partners. The possible audiences include likeminded experts
in the modeller's specialised field of inquiry and those in disagreernent, other rnembers
of one's own discipline and those in other disciplines, students and journal editors,
rnedia and policy makers, and so on. The expectations and belief's of particular target
audiences partly determine what is offered to them by the rnodellers. This provides
anothel. pragmatic aspect of modelling. (One can of course try to embed the roles
of audience in the category of purpose, but this would make the latter intlactably
extensive and variegated and internally structured, so I prefèr keeping audience as a
separate comPonent.)
I mentioned gsing an audience as a test partrìer. Any tnodel, in the course of its lif'e-
time, travels through a private-public dimension, fiom private conception to public
acceptance or rejection. At various stages, audiences as test partners can be intel'nal
(moåelter herself) or external (other scientists or non-scientists)' The internal audi-
ence as a test partner examines the conceivecl model for its public recognisability and
acceptability, at least fbr f'urther study and discussion, before subt¡itting it to public
scrutiny, Anticipations of the forthcoming publio reception of the model are shaped by
the dominant modelling conventions in the <liscipline or research field, so the model
had better be constructed and proposed without violating these social conventions to
have a chance. The public examination of models will therefore virtually always re-
strict itself to a limited and relatively homogeneous set of candidate models (see Mãki,
1993, p.97). This is one mechanisrn resulting in the sort of intellectual herd behaviour
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that has been lnentioned among the sources of modelling failure regarding the 200g
crisis.
So it is possible that much of the most lespectable academic work in econornic nrod-
addressed to people in policy practice, the latter rnay have been happy to l.eceive them
without complaints because the economy was believed to u".rnning its course suf'_
ficiently smoothly and perhaps because the message fì.om the academia was in line
with their political prejudices. Incleecl, one of the suspicions presented by the cr.itics is
that the belief in the self'-stabilizing capacities o1'unregulated markets has been strong
both among leading economists and among leading politioians, and that these beliefs
have fbrtilìed one anorher (see e.g. Stiglitz 2010 and euiggin 2010).
... al least potentially prornpting genuine issues of relevant resemblctnce between M





objectively ontological and subjectively pragmatic aspects. Resemblance is a matter
of objective matter of fact, while lelevance is a matter. of relativity [o some purposes,





Another kind of f'ailure occut's when thete is no trying at all, unlike in the case of
a fäilure to attemPt. In what I
dl (rather than bridges), with
hnaginary model worlds are
ts learning a great deal about
not alone with this susPicion.
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sotne later (generations ot) researchers. Both of these dimensions have been utilised
by economists in defènding their models. (See Mäki 2O09a,20lla.)
The critical diagnosis, that rnajor parts of economic rnoclellin.
may have degenerated of irnaginary model worlds onty. *itt, nã
issues of resemblance ,r the prevalent divisio¡ of scientiûc laboi
or along a natural ternporal sequence of intellectual eflbrt. This situation rerutts in
treating models as substitute systems that ar.e investigated in their own right with no
concern whatsoever with how they might connecf with real-world systems. Such a
tendency may have been supported by a variety of factor.s, such as the increasin!
specialization of econornic inquiry, its over-mathematization, ancl perhaps ¡n ,omE
cases by the fact that economists and some of their audiences have beón charmJ
by the smooth f'unctioning of mo<lel economies within the moclel worlcls, appar"ntlj
justifying non-interventionist artitudes in policy making.
. . . describing M and drawing inferences about M and R in terms of one or more model
descriptions D;
A given rnodel can be described variously, such as in terms of verbal means, algebra,
geometry, diagrams, etc. It is in terms of whatever mediurn is used for aesciiUing
the model world that inferences are drawn about the properties and behaviour of thal
model world. Each type of medium has consequences fbr many other things in the
rnodelling exercise, such as the range of inferences and claims that can be made (and
are likely to be made) about the models, the range of ingredients to be included in the
lnodels, and the sorts of audience that can be reached.
In econolnics education, addressing students from introductory to advanced levels,
one and the same model can be described valiously at difïerent stages of the education
process' beginning with using easily accessible mathernatics and gradually employing
ever lnore demanding techniques. In policy memos, one may explain the key ,"rrugã
ol a model verbally, perhaps using diagrams, and then adding an appendix with a f.ull-
blown mathernatical description of the model (with goals ruãh u, ãxporing the model
to expert scrutiny or impressing the policy makels with a fäçade of scientificity). The
structure of journal articles in terms of rnodel description techniques also resonates
with issues of audience, such as the leadability of published articles and the sales ancl
citations attracted by the journal.
It has been argued that the popularity of sophisticated mathematical means of descrip-
tion may have l'ortifìed the allegedly great distance between sorne economic models
and the real world. This charge can be made m.re precise by invoking the idea of
formal tractability as a dominant guiding principle of modelling (see e.g. Hindriks,
2006). The claim then would be that economists may have been excessively and un-
critically constrained and inspired by considerations of fbrmal tractability rather than
empirical adequacy or relevant resernblance, and that this has imposetl serious limi-
tations on how they view the world, The discipline suffers from .lthe obsession with
technique over substance" (Hodgson, 2009, p. 1210).
Recall Krugman's claim that the charm of "impressive-looking mathematics" has
¡4odellittg failure
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that we do not have cnough mathematics."
. .. and applies commentary C to identify and coordinate the other components
By themselves, model to reach an audience'
orl to link with a targe their relations to strch
other things are compl they require clarifica-
tion and coordination. ntary' Yet there is no
world.
provide such a commentary.
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emphasise the high importance of supplementing (sound or unsound) models with a
sound commentary, but it is not obvious that economists are doing their best in this
regard.
It should be part of the academic competences of trained economists to be able to be
clear about what their models are fbr; what the models are about; what the models are
capable of doing, and what not; how reliable the models are; what sorts of criticìsms
an explicit warning dilected at the non-scientific users of the model,, (colan{er., 2010,
p. 424). Such warning labels would alert the relevant audiences to the capabilities and
limitations of the models.
It is clear that the commentary attached to popular economic models has fàiled in
spelling out their potentials and limitations. This has led to existing models bei¡g
used fbr inappropriate purposes and non-existing but important models not having
been built at all. Existing models depict bubble-free econornies, but they have been
erroneously applied to the current financialized economies that are not bubble-free;
and models that would be adequate fbr representing our bubble-prone economies
have fäiled to be developed by a suf f,cient number of sulficiently 
"t"ãibl" 
economists.
.. . and all this takes place within a context X
The final component of the context of modelling includes lots of various further in-
gredients that rnake a difl'erence for models and modelling practices. It includes items
such as intra-disciplinary conventions and practices, standards and incentives, arange-
ments of education, research and publishing, and so on. The context also includes
v luding non- and constraining conditions, ex_
p , resources, ffansformation of the university
ir cietal status contextual f'actors make a di¡ect
or indirect impact on the other components of the system of modelling.
por example, the deficiencies in the competence of the economics profession to 
pro-
vide adequate commentary of the capabilities and limitations of the 
models it produces
is likely to be an outcome of the rather nalrow education nowadays ofïered 
[o eco-
no-i., ,tud"nts - consisting mainly of recent economic theory ancl mathematical 
and
statistical techniques. lt is lenerally recognized that fätal consequences may 
t'ollow




Thinking of the allegedly flawetl contents of the models behind the 
2008 crisis more
directly, the structure of tr,e disciplinary division of intellectual labour 
may have
pruy"i i*p-tant roles. That the isólations of macroeconomic rnodels have 
excluded
ãu*uff' relevant details of financial markets is partly a product of the 
structure of
within economics, namely the increased specialization that has
betweenthetwofields:..Thefactthatfìnanceandmacroeco-
Separatefielclswithsomedifficultiesofintercommunicationmay
have been the inevitablË result of the relentless pressure for 
ever-greater specialization
in academic disciplines." (Posner, 2009, p' 328)
As to the epistemic values and conventions underlying disciplinary 
practices, the ideal
of formal tractability may have favoured certain problematic idealizations 
and sup-
p."rr"d the pursuit of rátuat adequacy. A tendency towards substitute modelling
may have be"n ,upport"ã uy roito.", in the division of labour in economic 
inquiry
(ecånomists ,upporãAty bridging the gap between theoretical models 
and their targets
not showing up); by tnä "olniuiro.y 
in""ntiu" to publish elegant modelling exercises
ddress isiues ofreal-world connections; and
n-academic audiences being
omies, therefore reluctant to
Exceptional amongst the social sci in con-
temporary society, the intellectual ardless
of its failures. Above, I cited Cola d more
than we <1o" and we could add that econo conse-
quencgof-protectingandpromotingtheirsociallyacknowledgedauthority'Inthe
worst case, there is a-nightmarish scenario on which the more 
economists are con-
sulted fbr policy advice, ih" ^o." 
they need to pretend to know,_and so the higher the
likelihood of póli"i", going astray. Avoiding the nightmare would require 
some smarl
restructuring àf the institutions of the economics discipline'
Moders and mode'ing as such *" o"*"Ï, means of acquiring infbrmation about
dynamically complex iystems such as economies' While powerful' 
they are also prone
toerrorandepistemic.i*t-un¿notjustepistemicrisk,butinstitutionalriskaswell
in that the (academic and other) instiiutions of economic inquiry 
may fail to provide
appropriateincentivesandotherpreconditionsforadequatemodelling.Investigating
fàilure 391
398 Modelling fai lure
the possibility and actuality of modelling failure is a matter of exercising disciplinary
risk management (see Mäki, 2011a).
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